The International and Domestic Determinants of Insider Trading Laws

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/147054/1/j.1468-2478.2010.00604.x.pd

Extending Trade Law Precedent

Precedent is celebrated as a fundamental feature of dense legal systems as it creates predictability, builds coherence, and enhances the authority of courts and tribunals. But, in international adjudication, precedent can also affect interstate cooperation and ultimately the legitimacy of international organizations. Wary of clashing with state interests, most international dispute settlement systems are designed so that rulings do not set obligatory precedent. This Article describes the role of precedent in the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to explain how precedent can affect compliance with the decisions of international courts and tribunals (ICs). This Article makes two main contributions. First, it shows that there can be precedent without a formal stare decisis rule. In theory the AB has a rule against binding precedent. Based on empirical evidence, however, this Article shows that the AB has in fact a strong norm of relying on prior decisions. Second, it shows that over time, the widening of legal commitments can result from extending precedent to new situations and this has an impact on the ability or willingness of states to comply. These findings have implications for the WTO and beyond. For the WTO, efforts to better define the value of precedent are unlikely to resolve the general mistrust of the AB and, therefore, this Article proposes other solutions to control the drift resulting from precedent. Beyond the WTO, international scholars should account for the intertemporal dimension of legal commitments in analyzing and explaining compliance with international law

Towards an effective appellate mechanism for ISDS tribunals

Published online: 21 June 2023This Article identifies the problems of an Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals in relation with its possible benefits. We propose the inclusion of certain design features to improve the working of an eventual Appellate Mechanism and help mitigate problems related to procedural, conflict resolution, and substantive concerns. We finish by identifying the most central problems with a possible Appellate Mechanism, which helps to narrow down options within the ongoing reform process at UNCITRAL. Overall, we illustrate how institutional choice is always contextual and that all institutional options are imperfect and subject to important trade-offs

The appellate body’s judicial pathway : precedent, resistance and adaptation

Published: November 2023This chapter looks at twenty years of practice of the global trade regime to illustrate the limits of change in international law. It is noted that, despite a strong norm to follow prior rulings, the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body modified precedent regularly—especially in the face of past non-compliance. This finding has at least two implications for the framework proposed by Krisch and Yildiz. On the one hand, judicial change is limited by the receptors of legal change. These receptors (here, respondent governments) might express dissatisfaction by failing to comply, rendering courts’ decisions and proposed changes ineffective. On the other hand, adjudicators must also be strategic with respect to the changes enabled by their decisions. Importantly, the judicial pathway is conditioned by the ability of their decisions to result in compliance. A judiciary that prioritizes change over authority might see a backlash that renders them ineffective

Replication Data for: Leadership Turnover and the Durability of International Trade Commitments

Contains replication files for Julia Gray and Jeffrey Kucik manuscript "Leadership Turnover and the Durability of International Trade Commitments.

Replication Data for: Does the presence of foreign troops affect stability in the host country?

Data (.dta) and commands (.do) to replicate our paper, "Does the presence of foreign troops affect stability in the host country?

The Costs of Domestic Political Unrest

Does domestic political unrest deter foreign direct investment (FDI)? And what are the longer term impacts of unrest upon the market? Most theories suggest that investors are deterred by unrest. However, empirical research returns only marginal support. We argue that these mixed results stem from the conflation of the distinct tactics and outcomes of political unrest. Violent forms of unrest increase uncertainty and risk. By comparison, nonviolent forms of unrest are shown to more frequently achieve their goals and increase the prospects for democratic change and market stability. In addition, investors avoid markets where campaigns have ended in failure, defined as the campaign not achieving their stated political aims. Failed campaigns often precipitate a cycle of unrest that create greater uncertainty over the long-term stability of a state. We find strong evidence in favor of our propositions, even after taking political motivation and non-random selection into account

Replication Data for: "Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade?" (Chaudoin, Kucik, Pelc)

These are all the replication materials for "Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade?" which is forthcoming at ISQ